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“Every system of scientific theory involves philosophical assumptions” (Talcott Parsons). 





The main point of this paper is to contribute to understanding Milton Friedman’s 1953 
“The Methodology of Positive Economics” (hereafter F1953), one of the most influential 
statements of economic methodology of the twentieth century, and, in doing so, help discern the 
non trivial but complex role of philosophic ideas in the shaping of economic theorizing and 
economists’ self-conception.1 It also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
theoretical origins of the so-called ‘Chicago’ school of economics.   
In this paper, I first present detailed textual evidence of the familiarity of George Stigler 
with the early work of Talcott Parsons, the most important American translator and 
disseminator of Max Weber’s ideas, who also helped create sociology as a distinct discipline in 
the United States.
2
 The Chicago-Parsons link is no surprise because historians have known that 
Frank Knight and Parsons corresponded, first about translating Weber and then about matters of 
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 Knight, who was a doctoral advisor to Stigler and teacher of Milton Friedman, 
was not merely the first American translator of Weber, but remained keenly and, perhaps, 
increasingly interested in Weber throughout his life.
4
 I am unfamiliar with any investigation of 
the Weberian influence on Knight’s students.5  
I show that Stigler praises Parsons’ treatment of Alfred Marshall, who plays an outsized 
role in Friedman’s self-conception of economics and economic theory.6  I also show that Stigler 
calls attention to the methodological similarity between Friedman and Parsons. Finally, I turn to 
F1953, and I show, first, that some of its most distinctive and philosophically interesting claims 
echo Parsons’ treatment of methodological matters; second that once alerted one can note 
Weberian terminology in F1953.
7
 
Three disclaimers about the argument of this paper: first my approach does not remove 
all the confusions that people have discerned in Friedman’s arguments in F1953.8 Seeing 
Friedman as echoing themes from Parsons sensitizes one to what elsewhere I (unhelpfully) 
called Friedman’s “neo-Kantian” understanding of assumptions in theorizing.9 Second the 
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in T. Raffaelli, M. Dardi, G. Beccatini and K. Caldari (eds). The Diffusion of Alfred Marshall’s Thought, 
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Friedman’s Methodology” American Economic Review, 73 (March 1983): 129-144, offer an influential and popular 
account of Friedman’s Popperianism. Friedman and Popper met through the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 and there 
is no doubt that Friedman became familiar with Popper’s philosophy. The argument of mythis paper suggests, 
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writings of Parsons need not be the most important one for understanding F1953’s arguments. 
More attention needs to be given to J. N. Keynes,
10
 whom Friedman cites in the opening lines of 
F1953
11
 and who was much praised by Stigler in this period (see below). No doubt they enjoyed 
the irony of praising the father while criticizing the more famous son. Third I use Parsons as a 
proxy for a kind of innovative Weberian social science. Even though there surely are non-trivial 
differences between Parsons and Weber, I see Parsons' The Structure of Social Action (first 
edition 1937; hereafter Structure)
12
 as constructing a Weberian program that is supposed to 




1. Stigler’s Interest in Parsons 
In an important short piece from 1943, George Stigler criticizes what soon became the 
dominant approach within professional economics; that approach combines sophisticated 
mathematical technique, a focus on revealed preference, and an understanding of economics 
(inspired by L. Robbins) as resource maximization under constraint. Near the end of his 
discussion, Stigler writes: 
“it is sufficient for present purposes merely to refer to such well-known presentations as 
those of Durkheim in sociology and Gierke in politics. Talcott Parsons probably had 
economists in mind when he wrote: "For it is a fact that social existence depends to a 
large extent on a moral consensus of its members and that the penalty of its too radical 
breakdown is social extinction. This fact is one which the type of liberal whose 
theoretical background is essentially utilitarian is all too apt to ignore-with unfortunate 
practical as well as theoretical consequences." At the level of economic policy, then, it is 
totally misleading to talk of ends as individual and random; they are fundamentally 
collective and organized. If this conclusion be accepted, and accept it we must, the 
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 J.N. Keynes The Scope and Method of Political Economy, London, 1891. 
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 “In his admirable book on The Scope and Method of Political Economy John Neville Keynes distinguishes among 
“[1] a positive science … a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is; [2] a normative or regulative 
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source of many mischievous errors”; and urges the importance of “recognizing a distinct positive science of political 
economy,” (3). 
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 All my references are to page-numbers of Talcott Parsons The Structure of Social Action, New York: Free Press; 
2nd edition, 1967-68. 
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 Weber’s methodology has been used to explain the continuity and discontinuities between neo-classical and 
behavioral economics very much in the spirit of the present article, see Erik Angner and George Loewenstein 
(manuscript) Foundations of Behavioral Economics. 
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economist may properly exceed the narrow confines of economic analysis. He may 
cultivate a second discipline, the determination of the ends of his society particularly 
relevant to economic policy. This discipline might be called, following J. N. Keynes, 
applied ethics.”14 
 
The American Economic Review was already the most important journal within 
economics. Stigler’s article opens with a long epigraph from Aristotle’s Ethics; Stigler then 
targets the new techniques developed by Samuelson, Hotelling, Lerner, Kaldor, and Hicks 
who are in the midst of launching a formal revolution within economics.
15
 His argument is 
philosophical not mathematical. In particular, Stigler argues that economists presuppose a 
moral and political consensus when they are doing policy science. Stigler -- who is echoing 
his teacher Knight here
16
 -- takes for granted that the economic sphere is framed or 
constrained by political or social ends. It is on this point that Stigler cites Parsons 
approvingly.
17
 Thus, Stigler’s argument leads to a distinction between pure economic 
analysis, in which ends are thought of as individual and random, and policy science (or 
applied ethics), where ends are unified; it this distinction that drives him to accept Keynes’ 
distinction between positive and normative science.  
Stigler’s point is not that economists should avoid policy science. Rather he insists that 
its normative presuppositions ought to be different than in pure economics. In his criticism 
of New Welfare economics Stigler argues for greater self-understanding on the part of 
economists about the essentially political nature of welfare economics when applied to 
societies. In context, Stigler’s point is meant to warn against two tendencies: first, the 
tendency to import the representative agent into the pure part of economic analysis; second, 
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 George J. Stigler “The New Welfare Economics,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1943), 
pp. 355-359, emphasis added. 
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 David M. Levy, and Sandra J. Peart "Stigler, George Joseph (1911–1991)," in S. Durlauf, ed., The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, 2008. 
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 Stephen Stigler informs me that his father owned a copy of the first 1937 edition of Parsons’ Structure.  Stigler 
writes, “He read it but with few notes.  Inside the back cover he marked 3 page numbers: 392, 395, 248.  (in that 
order).  In addition there are marginal dashes on pages 232, 256, and 566,” (personal communication, March 31, 
2010). All six pages concern the common moral values/ends of a political community; they provide the 
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Stigler’s argument presupposes, of course, that there is a self-sufficient a-political 
domain of pure economics: Friedman’s “positive” economics. The reference to Parsons 
reminds us that at the theoretical origins of ‘Chicago,’ the division of labor within 
economics is justified on social theoretical grounds. 
It is not the only important reference to Parsons in Stigler during the 1940s. In 1949 
Stigler gave five lectures at the LSE that were published as a separate booklet.
19
 Near the 
end of the second lecture Stigler remarks, “I wish to close by offering an estimate of the net 
contribution of the attempt to construct a theory of monopolistic competition. Before 
undertaking this appraisal, however, it is necessary to set forth certain methodological 
principles,” (23). Stigler then writes: 
 
“The purpose of the study of economics to permit us to make predictions about the 
behavior of economic phenomena under specified conditions. The sole test of the 
usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance between its predictions and the 
observable course of events. Often a theory is criticized or rejected because its assumptions 
are “unrealistic.” Granting for a moment that this charge has meaning, it burdens theory 
with an additional function, that of description. This is a most unreasonable burden to place 
upon theory: the role of description is to particularize, while the role of theory is to 
generalize—to disregard an infinite number of differences and capture the important 
common element in different phenomena.” (Five Lectures, 23). 
 
Stigler adds the following footnote: “The present interpretation of these principles is due to 
Professor Milton Friedman; see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action.”  I am 
unaware of any attention to this footnote in the enormous literature on F1953. It is no 
surprise that Stigler would mention Friedman here. Compare him on “positive economics”: 
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 In F1953 Friedman assumes that in advanced societies values have converged. For the significant afterlife of the 
issue, see Schliesser “Friedman, Positive Economics, and the Chicago Boys,” loc cit., and Ross Emmett "Realism 
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“Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to 
be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it 
yields. … In so far as a theory can be said to have ‘assumptions’ at all, and in so far as 
their ‘realism’ can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation 
between the significance of a theory and the ‘realism’ of its ‘assumptions’ is almost the 
opposite of that suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and significant 
hypotheses will be found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive 
representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more 
unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense),” (F1953, 4 and 14) 
 
Stigler’s views are very similar to the ones made famous in F1953 (where Stigler is thanked 
in the first footnote and the Five Lectures is cited in note 38). At the time of the Five 
Lectures Stigler was at Columbia while Friedman had just returned to Chicago. Friedman 
and Stigler knew each other from Chicago in the 30s, were colleagues in the Statistical 
Research Group at Columbia during the war, and had shared an office at Minnesota for a 
year.
20
 We know from their correspondence that in this period Stigler and Friedman were 
intensely discussing methodological matters.
21
 
Stigler’s familiarity with Parson’s Structure should not come as a surprise given 
Knight’s connections with Parsons.22 In his first publication (reworked version of his 
doctoral dissertation), Stigler writes in his study of Alfred Marshall, “No attempt will be 
made to discuss the numerous commentaries [on Marshall]…there is no need to reproduce 
Parsons’ path-breaking analysis of Marshall’s philosophical preconceptions and their 
influence on his doctrines.” 23  
  While one can never rule out a certain amount of mischief on the part of Stigler (who 
may have enjoyed linking his friend’s developing views to a very long work on social theory), I 
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 Milton Friedman “George Stigler: A Personal Reminiscence,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 5 
(Oct., 1993), pp. 768-773 
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 J. Daniel Hammond and Claire H. Hammond, Making Chicago Price Theory: Friedman-Stigler correspondence 
1945-1957, London: Routledge, 2006. 
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 In his 1942 textbook The Theory of Competitive Price (New York: MacMillan) 20, Stigler refers to Parsons’ 
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recommendations are to works by Knight, Robbins, J.N. Keynes, and Cohen & Nagel’s Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method. I thank David Levy for scanning relevant pages on my behalf. 
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treat the note as sincere expression of the fact that Stigler’s views on methodology were inspired 




2. Parsons and Chicago. 
Parsons’ Structure is a major study of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber. It employs 
intellectual history as a form of theorizing. As Parsons writes in the “Preface” to the Second 
edition (1949), “The Structure of Social Action analyzes a process of convergent theoretical 
development which constituted a major revolution in the scientific analysis of social 
phenomena,” (xvi). Parsons’ role is not a passive observer of the revolution. “Only very 
gradually did it become evident that in the treatment of these problems, even from such diverse 
points of view, there was involved a common conceptual scheme” preface to the first edition, 
(xxii). The common conceptual scheme was not clear to the participants, but requires Parsons’ 
intellectual labor to be made visible.
25
 So, even when he is describing others, he is often also 
speaking in his own voice.  
My argument does not require that Friedman read Parsons,
26
 but in what follows I collect 
some of Parsons’ observations and compare them with some notable methodological and 
conceptual passages in F1953. I focus on three aspects distinctive of the methodology of F1953. 
While a few of these offer remarkable similarities none is decisive for my overall argument. 
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 Earlier in the Five Lectures, in his treatment of Marshall, Stigler made a point of citing the relevant chapter of 
Structure not the earlier journal articles on which they are based (5).   
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However, as a group they capture important features of the (indirect) influence of Parsons that I 
identify in F1953. First, theories only produce partial visions. Parsons writes, “The structure of 
the conceptual scheme itself inevitably focuses interest on a limited range of such empirical 
facts. These may thought of as a “spot” in the vast encircling darkness, brightly illuminated as by 
a searchlight. The point is what lies outside the spot is not really “seen” until searchlight 
moves…” (Structure, 16) Without Friedman drops the searchlight metaphor Friedman, but 
claims the same: “A theory is the way we perceive ‘facts,’ and we cannot perceive ‘facts’ 
without a theory.” (34; the scare quotes are Friedman’s.) Friedman’s way of putting it also 
highlights that there are no ‘facts’ independent from theory.  (Parsons writes in his discussion of 
Weber, “Observation is always in terms of a conceptual scheme,” 597.) It connects with 
Friedman’s larger methodological claim, which he often attributes to Alfred Marshall who “took 
the world as it is; he sought to construct an “engine” to analyze it, not a photographic 
reproduction of it,”27 (35; recall Stigler’s view that the role of theory is not description.)  
Second, Parsons and Friedman offer a similar two-fold conceptual structure of theories. 
Parsons writes approvingly that according to Pareto: “science is best characterized by the term 
‘logico-experimental.’” Parsons explains:  
 
“That is to say, there are two essential elements involved: logical reasoning and observation 
of ‘fact.’ Logical reasoning is by itself incapable of yielding necessary results beyond 
tautologies, but none the less it is an essential element. It is thought of, however, as 
subordinate to the other element, that of fact, experimental or observed.” (181; scare-quotes 
in Parsons).  
 
Friedman’s conceptual structure also stresses the tautological aspect of one part of theory and the 
empirical of the other part: 
 
“theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two elements.  In part, it is a ‘language’ 
designed to promote ‘systematic and organized methods of reasoning.’  In part, it is a 
body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality. 
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  See also Friedman’s “The Marshallian Demand Curve,” 469; 470; 490 and Parsons’ treatment of Pareto: “Pareto 
states that “it is impossible to know a concrete phenomenon in all its details.” It is no valid criticism of a theory that 
it does not suffice fully to explain a concrete phenomenphenomenon; on the contrary it is a virtue,” (Structure, 183). 
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Viewed as a language, theory has no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies.  Its 
function is to serve as a filing system organizing empirical material and facilitating our 
understanding of it; and the criteria by which it is to be judged are appropriate to a filing 
system. …  Factual evidence alone can show whether the categories of the ‘analytical 
filing system’ have a meaningful empirical counterpart, that is, whether they are useful 
in analyzing particular class of concrete problems” (F1953, 7). 
 
Friedman has switched from the language of subordination (between the tautological and 
empirical part) to the more neutral language of serving a function. Moreover, Friedman 
introduces an important function of theory characteristic of his more general outlook: it makes 
possible the analysis of concrete problems.
28
  
 Third, this last point is connected to a very important example in Friedman’s argument: 
his treatment of Galileo’s law of fall which runs through F1953. 
 
“We may start with a simple physical example, the law of falling bodies.  It is an accepted 
hypothesis that the acceleration of a body dropped in a vacuum is a constant …and is 
independent of the shape of the body, the manner of dropping it, etc…. The application of 
this formula to a compact ball dropped from the roof of a building is equivalent to saying that 
a ball so dropped behaves as if it were falling in a vacuum. … Suppose, however, that a 
feather is dropped instead of a compact ball.  The formula then gives wildly inaccurate 
results,” (F1953, 16-17ff; see also 24, 36).29  
 
Friedman was not the first to employ the example in this fashion. According to Parsons, Pareto  
 
“resorts to the methodological device of analyzing an abstract society, which is exactly 
analogous to the device of treating bodies as if they fell in a vacuum. The situation is closely 
analogous to that in which mechanics would be if all bodies on this earth were of a density 
relative to that of the atmosphere approximating that of feathers. The law of gravitation could 
be scarcely be arrived at by a process of empirical generalization from their actual behavior 
in nature, or by dropping them from high places. But this would be no reason why the law of 
gravitation would fail to hold in such a world…Scientific progress is a matter of successive 
approximation. Therefore the meanings of the symbols employed in scientific theories are 
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 This fits with his larger claim during this period that many of the relevant details of the component parts of the 
economy are not known yet. For details, see Schliesser “Inventing Paradigms, Monopoly, Methodology, and 
Mythology at 'Chicago',” op. cit.  
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 For analysis see Eric Schliesser “Galilean Reflections on Milton Friedman’s "Methodology of Positive 
Economics," with Thoughts on Vernon Smith’s "Economics in the Laboratory,"” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
Vol. 35, No. 1, 2005, pp 50-74. See also G. Stigler The Theory of Competitive Price, op cit. p. . 
10 
 
never fully adequate expressions of the aspects of the concrete phenomena they attempt to 
formulate.” (216).  
 
From Parsons’ account it is not obvious if fall in a vacuum is the example that Pareto uses (or 
merely a helpful illustration by Parsons of Pareto’s willingness to treat a society in abstraction).30 
Parsons turns Pareto’s use of abstraction into a defense of successive approximation and an 
attack on crude empiricism. In the world where all bodies were of a density relative to that of the 
atmosphere approximating that of feathers the law of fall would seem to presuppose wildly 
unrealistic assumptions. Yet it would still be true. 
 Parsons’ treatment of Pareto shows that when dealing with messy empirical details 
through abstraction or as-if modeling one can simultaneously hold that one’s assumptions are 
unrealistic and still think one’s theory is appropriate in the analysis of a concrete example.  This 
is a theme that runs through Parsons’ book. In fact, he seems to identify it as a key factor in 
theoretical success: “Utterly dependent logically on this “erroneous” premise [i.e., identity of 
interests]
31
 there grew up what is perhaps the most highly developed theoretical system in the 
social sciences [utilitarianism] with correct results—within certain limitations. This fact may 
serve as a lesson to those who are overly puristic in their scientific methodology. Perhaps it is not 
always wise to discard even methodologically objectionable elements so long as they serve a 
useful scientific function, unless one has something better to substitute” (101).32 
Finally, so far I have called attention to some similarities between Parsons’ Structure and 
F1953. These similarities identified between Structure and F1953 are no proof either of 
Friedman’s reading of Parsons or his familiarity with Weberian thought, despite the importance 
of Weber to Frank Knight and Stigler’s familiarity with Parsons. The similarities suggest that 
Stigler was right to call attention to the connection in Five Lectures.  
Upon re-reading F1953 in light of my argument, one must find the following oft-ignored 
passage striking: 
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 It is in Vilfredo Pareto “The New Theories of Economics,” Journal of Political Economy, volume 5, No. 4 (Sep., 
1897), pp. 485-502. Pareto is defending the use of mathematics in the study of humans. Friedman certainly knew his 
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 On Friedman’s realism, see Kevin Hoover “Milton Friedman's Stance: The Methodology of Causal Realism,” 
(February 5, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902062. See also Friedman’s letter to Stigler 




“The abstract model corresponding to this hypothesis contains two “ideal” types of 
firms: atomistically competitive firms, grouped into industries, and monopolistic firms. 
 A firm is competitive if the demand curve for its output is infinitely elastic with respect 
to its own price for some price and all outputs, given the prices charged by all other 
firms; it belongs to an “industry” defined as a group of firms producing a single 
“product” ... A firm is monopolistic if the demand curve for its output is not infinitely 
elastic at some price for all outputs.
29 … As always, the hypothesis as a whole consists 
not only of this abstract model and its ideal types but also of a set of rules, mostly 
implicit and suggested by example, for identifying actual firms with one or the other 
ideal type and for classifying firms into industries.  The ideal types are not intended to 
be descriptive; they are designed to isolate the features that are crucial for a particular 
problem.” (35). 
 
It is accompanied by the following footnote: 
 
“29. This ideal type can be divided into two types: the oligopolistic firm, if the demand 
curve for its output is infinitely elastic at some price for some but not all outputs; the 
monopolistic firm proper, if the demand curve is nowhere infinitely elastic.” 
 
This is the passage in which Friedman explains how theory is an “engine” for research in 
Marshall. Here one can see Friedman casually employing the very Weberian language of “ideal 
types” and explaining their function in Weberian terms (cf. Structure, 601ff). Weber’s theory of 
ideal types is often associated with Weber’s program of verstehen. This is also emphasized in 
Parsons’ Structure (583ff). One might think that Friedman’s and Stigler’s (recall Five Lectures, 
23) methodological focus on predictions runs counter to Weberian understanding. This is 
mistaken for two reasons. 
First, Parsons introduces verstehen in the context of emphasizing Weber’s claim that “the 
natural and social sciences are in the same situation with respect to the standard so often applied, 
predictability….predictability is always relative to the extent of abstract generalization” 
(Structure, 582). So, in Parsons’ account of Weber, prediction and verstehen go hand in hand. 
Second, recall that in F1953 theory’s “function is to serve as a filing system organizing empirical 
material and facilitating our understanding of it” (7). This is no isolated occurrence. In fact, in 
defending his focus on as if theorizing and predictability, Friedman writes, “A meaningful 
scientific hypothesis or theory typically asserts that certain forces are, and other forces are not, 
12 
 
important in understanding a particular class of phenomena. It is frequently convenient to present 
such a hypothesis by stating that the phenomena it is desired to predict behave in the world of 
observation as if they occurred in a hypothetical and highly simplified world containing only the 
forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important,” (40). 
 While Friedman seems to have no interest in the normative orientation of action (which is 
crucial to Parsons’ Weber, cf. 602, 615, etc) and he does not wish to make economics into an 
interpretive science, the peculiar mix of i) value neutrality of research within a conceptual 
scheme; ii) the unreality of assumptions; iii) the importance of predictability; iv) the 
methodological symmetry between natural and social science; v) the importance of 
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